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1.	Overview	1.1	Abstract	This	study	examines	the	relationship	between	company	management	guidance,	and	ex-ante	crash	risk	over	the	duration	of	the	2008(Jan	2006-Dec	2009)	financial	crisis	using	the	implied	volatility	skew,	which	is	based	upon	ex	ante	volatility	implied	by	the	pricing	model	developed	by	Black-Scholes (1973).	The	study	finds	that	over	the	duration	of	this	crisis	period,	management	guidance	decreases	with	a	rise	in	ex-ante	crash	risk.	Further	the	study	provides	evidence	on	the	relationship	of	management	guidance	and	earnings	volatility,	and	how	that	is	affected	by	firm	concentration	and	industry.		1.2	Introduction		Looking	at	the	statistical	relationship	between	guidance	from	company	management	and	ex-ante	stock	price	crash	risk	is	important	to	the	field	of	finance	due	to	the	fact	that	it	will	help	in	understanding	and	managing	investors	fear	after	a	large	stock	price	crash	has	occurred.	This	is	important	to	look	at	because	a	large-scale	decline	in	stock	price	is	the	loss	of	a	substantial	amount	of	asset	value	beyond	what	it’s	valued	at	on	a	company’s	balance	sheet,	Blanchard	(2009).	Due	to	money	multiplier	effect	Blanc	&	Peterson	(2012),	the	loss	of	significant	asset	value	following	a	stock	price	crash	risk	is	much	larger	than	its	monetary	value	to	company.	For	example,	when	accounting	for	the	jobs	that	could	have	been	created	from	a	percentage	of	that	loss	asset	value,	or	accounting	for	the	long	run	jobs	that	could	have	been	created	from	the	next	big	product	that	may	not	be	developed	by	a	
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company	due	to	the	fact	that	a	stock	experienced	a	stock	price	crash	risk,	that	may	be	attributed	to	the	way	in	which	a	company’s	management	discloses	information	to	the	market.	In	this	study,	the	results	are	relevant	to	standard	setters	who	stress	it	as	their	role	and	responsibility	to	help	nurture	and	restore	investor	confidence	(U.S.	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	2008).	The	restoration	of	investor	confidence	is	crucial	if	the	economic	longevity	of	the	United	States	of	America	is	to	be	assured.	It	is	essential	to	bring	retail	investors	back	into	the	financial	system,	if	they	are	too	distrustful	of	the	market	to	even	participate	it	in	it	then	the	economic	wheels	that	deployed	capital	in	the	U.S.	will	cease	to	turn.			 This	study	will	add	to	the	literature	that	attempts	to	link	ex-ante	crash	risk	to	financial	reporting.	Most	recently	in	the	last	couple	of	years	there	have	been	significant	breakthroughs	that	have	lead	us	to	analyze	and	look	for	previously	un	noticed	contributors	to	a	stock	price	crash.	Kim	and	Zhang	(2014)	document	that	ex	ante	crash	risk	increases	with	the	presence	of	financial	restatements	and	internal	control	weaknesses.	And	even	more	recently	J.-B.	Kim	et	all	(2016)	that	find	high	comparability	is	associated	with	low	ex	ante	crash	risk	,	even	after	controlling	for	various	aspects	of	reporting	quality	or	transparency.	In	this	respect	the	study	adds	to	the	understanding	of	the	linkage	between	ex-ante	crash	risk	and	managements	guidance	activity.		This	report	shows	that	there	is	a	negative	effect	upon	management	guidance,	and	perceived	stock	price	crash	risk	using	the	implied	volatility	skew1.	The	exploration	of	a	linkage	between	the	implied	volatility	skew																																																										 The option smirk curve is an indicator of investors' expected crash risk (Dumas et al., 1998; Bates, 2000). 
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and	management	guidance	has	yet	to	be	analyzed,	and	this	study	will	hopefully	encourage	more	analysis	upon	various	risk	proxies	in	the	derivatives	market	and	their	effect	upon	a	company’s	management.			 This	study	will	also	add	to	the	literature	that	focuses	on	manager’s	asymmetric	disclosure	of	good	versus	bad	news.	The	prior	studies	done	by	Jin	and	Myers	(2006)	conclude	that	managers	tend	to	systematically	withhold	bad	news.	Once	again,	one	of	the	more	recent	studies	done	by	J.-b.	kim	et	al	(2016)	suggests	that	financial	statement	comparability,	can	also	disincline	mangers	from	withholding	bad	news.	This	study	will	contribute	to	this	field	of	finance	by	confirming	the	fact	that	management	tends	to	withhold	bad	news,	and	further	showing	that	even	in	cases	when	management	can’t	for	see	a	macro-economic	shock	that	will	be	materially	impactful	upon	their	earnings,	management	will	tend	to	withhold	giving	guidance.	However,	depending	upon	an	industries	concentration,	using	the	HHI	index	2,	this	study	finds	that	for	the	observed	crisis	period	overall	earnings	volatility	isn’t	statically	significant	to	management	guidance	when	considering	all	the	companies	in	our	sample	set3,		even	in	the	presence	of	macro-economic	event	such	as	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.			 The	remainder	of	this	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	2.	Reviews	the	related	literature	and	further	explains	the	hypothesis.		Section	3.	Describes	the																																																																																																																																																																								2.	product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI). 	3.		Thomson Reuters’ First Call Historical Database (FCHD) was the initial data set that was used 
to pull potential companies  	
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research	process	and	data	collection	methods.	Section	4	presents	the	main	empirical	results	and	is	where	robustness	checks	are	performed.	Section	5	reports	the	results	for	additional	tests	that	were	performed.	Section	6	concludes	the	paper.		2.	Background,	related	literature,	and	empirical	prediction		2.1	Financial	statement	comparability			 The	purpose	of	financial	reporting	is	to	provide	market	participants	with	relevant	and	meaningful	information.	The	FASB	(2010)	states	that	this	is	accomplished	when	a	company’s	financial	statement	can	be	easily	compared	with	similar	reporting	companies.	There	have	been	numerous	studies	done	in	the	last	five	years	to	test	empirically	the	development	of	new	proxies	for	comparability.	(e.g.	Barth	et	al.;	2012,	Gong	et	al,	2013;	Chen	et	al.,	2014;	Kim	et.	Al.,	(2013).	The	general	theme	of	these	studies	is	that	higher	financial	statement	comparability	leads	to	easier	interpretations	for	investors,	and	ultimately	the	identification	of	firm	specific	risks.		
2.2	Ex	ante	crash	risk			 It	is	important	to	examine	ex	ante	crash	risk	perceived	by	investors,	because	a	lack	of	investor	confidence	is	one	of	the	key	reasons	of	price	declines	during	the	2008	financial	crisis.	Research	has	shown	that	perceived	fear	by	investors	of	a	pending	stock	price	crash,	can	have	a	snowball	effect	and	continue	the	price	decline.	Blanchard	(2009)	concluded	that	even	though	crash	risk	is	significant,	it	is	the	task	of	removing	the	perception	of	crash	risk	that	is	most	important	in	restoring	and	preventing	the	further	declining	of	asset	values	during	a	market	meltdown.		Research	done	by	Bollerslev	and	Todorov	(2011)	outline	that	because	realized	stock	
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price	crash	events	are	rare,	it	is	then	the	fear	of	these	“black	swan”	events	that	has	caused	the	majority	of	stock	price	crash’s.	However,	the	majority	of	financial	research	conducted	in	this	field	has	a	focus	on	ex	post-realized.	In	this	case	of	examining	ex-ante	stock	price	crash	risk,	means	the	use	of	the	volatility	smirk,	which	is	based	off	the	Black-Scholes	model	(1973).	The	use	of	the	implied	volatility	smirk	in	this	study	is	due	to	a	simple	reason;	the	iv	smirk	is	an	ex	ante	measurement	of	risk	and	is	then	utilized	before	actually	executing	making	investment	decision.	Research	performed	with	the	utilization	of	the	iv	smirk	to	measure	and	gauge	risk,	include	Bollen	and	Whaley	(2004);	Van	Buskirk	(2011);	Kim	and	Zhang	(2014).	Bates	(2008)	states,	the	option	market	could	be	functioning	as	an	insurance	market	such	that	OTM	put	options	act	as	a	hedge	against	future	stock	price	crashes.		
2.3	Link	between	management	guidance	and	ex-ante	implied	volatility		 The	analysis	of	the	studies	performed	with	this	may	questions	attributes	fir-specific	stock	price	crash	risk	to	the	dumping	of	bad	news	previously	hoarded	by	managers	(Black	and	Liu,	2007;	Hutton	et	al.	2009).		The	model	created	by	Jim	and	Myers	(2006)	concludes	that	managers	have	incentives	to	withhold	bad	information	due	to	their	concern	about	employment,	compensation,	reputation	etc.	When	this	bad	news	accumulates	enough	overtime,	when	it	is	released	upon	the	market	it	causes	a	large	and	abrupt	stock	price	crash	to	occur.	Another	A	study	conducted	by	Kim	et	al.	(2011)	show	a	positive	association	between	tax	avoidance	and	crash	risk,	the	study	argues	that	tax	avoidance	activities	facilitate	bad	news	hoarding	which	increases	the	likelihood	of	stock	price	crashes.	A	study	performed	by	Bradshaw	et	al.	
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(2010)	finds	that	when	measuring	firm	opacity	with	absolute	discretionary	accruals	it	is	positively	associated	with	the	steepness	of	the	implied	volatility	smirk.			 This	study	examines	the	statistical	relationship	between	management	guidance,	and	perceived	ex-ante	stock	price	crash	risk.		As	discussed	in	the	previous	section	this	study	adds	onto	the	previous	literature	associated	with	financial	statement	comparability	by	highlighting	the	need	for	a	potential	observable	measure	with	regards	to	financial	statement	reporting	specifically,	and	how	financial	statement	comparability	could	help	mitigate	the	drastic	stock	price	crashes	that	often	occur	due	to	managerial	earnings	management	tactics.	This	paper	proposes	that	a	statistic	that	would	signal	the	acknowledgement	of	an	unforeseen	macro-economic	shock	that	was	materially	relevant	to	their	financial	statements.	An	indicator	variable	that	would	accomplish	such	a	feat	would	have	to	be	composed	of	a	linguistic	scan	of	every	recorded/publically	disclosed	earnings	guidance	given	by	the	current	company	management.	The	variable	would	then	go	onto	further	slim	down	the	potential	list	of	acceptable	companies,	by	excluding	companies	whose	management	haven’t	acknowledge/	given	guidance	with	reference	to	a	macroeconomic	shock.	This	indicator	variable	would	allow	for	the	further	researching	into	the	skill	level	of	a	companies	management,	but	more	importantly	allows	for	the	further	diversification	at	the	firm	level	statistically	for	clustering.	The	reason	being	is	that	management	that	has	never	admitted	a	mistake	or	an	error	with	regards	to	their	forecasting	ability,	are	effected	characteristically	differently	at	the	firm	level	with	regards	to	fixed	effects/	random	effects.		This	is	because	a	company	
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who	won’t	acknowledge	the	relevancy	of	an	observable	or	potential	macro-economic	shock	to	their	earnings	period	is	at	the	firm	level	promoting	a	culture	of	shortsightedness.	This	area	of	research	has	been	touched	on	by	several	studies	and			
(Kale et al., 1991; Chan et al., 2001) concluded that there was positive relationship 
between high outcome uncertainty and abnormal earnings, cash flow, and stock price 
return volatility that inevitably increases the opportunity for the variables leading to cause 
a stock price crash. A variable,  that with some development could potentially serve as a 
proxy for the variable that I described, is the STRATEGY variable developed by Bentley 
et al. (2013) helps to differentiate between the various business strategies of companies. 	This	study	adds	on	to	the	previous	field	of	ex-ante	crash	risk	and	the	linkage	between	ex-ante	expected	crash	risk	and	management	guidance.	The	analysis	of	this	study	focuses	the	time	period	of	observation	over	the	duration	of	the	2008(Jan	2006-Dec	2009)	financial	crisis4.	This	period	of	volatility	also	has	a	clear	economic	and	meaningful	economic	study	adds	onto	financial	literature	that	over	the	duration	of	this	crisis	period,	management	guidance	decreases	with	a	rise	in	ex-ante	crash	risk.	Further	the	study	provides	evidence	on	the	relationship	of	management	guidance	and	earnings	volatility,	and	how	that	is	affected	by	firm	concentration	and	industry.		
Hypothesis:	There	will	be	a	statistically	significant	relationship	between	management	guidance,	and	the	implied	volatility	skew.	If	there	is	a	relationship	between	these	two	variables,	then	there	will	be	a	significant	relationship	as	well																																																									4	This	period	also	coincides	best	with	the	option	data	that	was	able	to	be	gathered,	without	being	able	to	use	the	Option	Metrics	data	service	
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between	management	guidance,	and	a	firm	level	variable	(e.g.	earnings	volatility)	only	during	periods	when	there	is	an	unforeseen	economic	shock,	that	could	potentially	have	a	material	effect	upon	earnings	(via.	versa	depending	on	HHI	characteristics.		3.	Research	Process		3.1	Data	Collection	Methods		The	usual	data	package,	Option	Metrics,	which	is	utilized	by	most	studies	to	conduct	statistical	analysis	with	derivatives	data,	was	not	available	as	a	resource	at	Claremont	McKenna	College.	Therefore	in	order	to	acquire	an	IV	Skew	variable,	it	was	required	to	build	a	macro	in	excel	that	used	the	Bloomberg	Plug-in	to	pull	the	options	pricing	data	for	the	required	ATM	calls	and	OTM	puts.	However,	another	hurdle	that	was	encountered	after	the	pricing	data	was	collected,	was	the	format	of	the	pricing	data.	The	way	that	the	Bloomberg	Pricing	function	is	constructed,	only	a	horizontal	output	can	be	generated.	In	order	to	then	import	this	pricing	data	into	stata	it	was	necessary	to	reformat	the	Bloomberg	data.	Besides	the	Bloomberg	data,	all	other	data	was	collected	fro	Compustat,	WRDS,		and	CRSP.		
3.2	Measuring	Implied	ex-ante	crash	Risk		
This	study	uses	the	terms	implied	volatility	smirk,	volatility	smirk,	and	implied	
volatility	skew	interchangeably.	I	will	use	a	direct	computational	method	in	order	
compute	an	implied	volatility	smirk	which	will	function	as	a	proxy	for	perceived	stock	
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crash	risk.	The	steepness	of	the	option	smirk	curve	will	be	suitable	as	an	indicator	of	
investor’s	perceived	firm-specific	risk,	as	shown	in	the	work	done	by	(dumas	et	al.,	1998;	
Bates,	2000).	The	first	step	to	determine	the	correct	combination	of	options	to	use	in	
order	to	calculate	the	volatility	smirk,	it	is	necessary	to	group	options	into	moneyness	
categories.	Following	the	work	done	by	(Bollen	and	Whaley,	2004;	Kim	and	Zhang,	2014)	
the	options	will	be	grouped	into	five	different	moneyness	categories	according	to	their	
delta	values.	5	 	I	then	follow	the	work	performed	
by	(Kim	and	Zhang,	2004)	in	order	to	come	up	with	the	formula	to	calculate	the	implied	
volatility	skew.	This	means	measuring	the	daily	implied	volatility	skew	of	stock	I’s	option	
as	the	difference	between	the	implied	volatility	of	OTM	puts	and	that	of	ATM	calls	
during	day	t.	When	there	are	multiple	put	or	call	option	contracts	for	stock	I	on	a	
particular	day,	I	will	calculate	the	weighted	average	of	the	implied	volatilities	for	the	put	
or	call	option,	using	option	open	interest	as	a	weight.	Then	in	order	to	obtain	an	annual	
																																																								5	The value of the option delta is between 0.375 and 0.625 (denoted ATMC) or between 0.375 and 0.125 
(denoted OTMP). We also used a duration of 90 days for the basis of the options, to calculate each 
IV_Skew 	
		 11	
measure	of	the	volatility	smirk,	following	the	work	of	Kim	and	Zhang	(2014),	I	will	
average	the	daily	IV_Skew	over	the	12-month	period	ending	three	months	after	the	
fiscal	year-end.	I	then	follow	the	work	performed	by	Kim	and	Zhang	(2004)	in	order	to	
come	up	with	the	formula	to	calculate	the	implied	volatility	skew.	This	will	mean	
measuring	the	daily	implied	volatility	skew	of	stock	I’s	option	as	the	difference	between	
the	implied	volatility	of	OTM	puts	and	that	of	ATM	calls	during	day	t.	6	
	
3.2	Measuring	Management	Opaqueness		
The	next	step	of	this	study	will	be	to	measure	management	opaqueness.	This	
study	will	combine	the	work	of	several	key	studies	that	look	at	the	statistical	
relationship	between	discretionary	accruals	and	crash	risk.	Combining	the	key	
takeaways	from	these	previous	studies,	we	will	supplement	the	analysis	of	the	activity	
of	management	guidance	pre-and	post-event	of	a	stock	price	crash.	This	analysis	of	the	
activity	of	management	with	regards	to	providing	guidance,	with	the	addition	of	
previously	proven	measures	of	financial	statement	comparability,	and	with	knowledge	
of	the	effects	of	financial	statement	comparability	on	voluntary	corporate	disclosure	of	
bad	news	than	to	that	of	good	news	thanks	to	(Kothari	et	al.,	2009)	will	allow	us	to	
compute	an	indicator	for	management	opaqueness.	When	starting	any	measurement	of	
management	opaqueness,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	the	work	done	by	Hutton	et	
																																																								6	Consistent with prior studies (Bollen and Whaley, 2004; Kim and Zhang, 2014), OTM puts are defined as 
put options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.125 and ATM calls are defined as call options with a 
delta value between 0.375 and 0.625. 	
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al.	(2009).	Hutton	found	that	discretionary	accruals	are	positively	associated	with	crash	
risk,	suggesting	that	accounting	opacity	(lack	of	financial	statement	comparability)	
enables	managers	to	hoard	bad	news	from	outsiders.	Recent	studies	by	Bradshaw	et	al.	
(2010),	Kim	et	al	(2011),	and	Kim,	Li,	Lu,	and	Yu	(2015)	provide	evidence	that	financial	
statement	comparability	reduces	ex	ante	crash	risk	perceived	by	options	market	
participants	and	that	investors	recognize	the	predictive	value	of	factors	related	to	
financial	statement	transparency.	Therefore,	the	first	step	in	this	measurement	process	
will	be	to	determine	the	accounting	opacity	for	each	company.		After	looking	at	the	
variables	for	comparability	that	were	developed	by	(Kim	et	al,	2016),	it	is	apparent	that	
the	summation	of	the	effects	of	management	opacity	is	the	issuance	of	guidance,	or	
not.	Therefore,	to	measure	management	opaqueness,	this	study	will	use	the	frequency	
of	management	guidance	as	a	proxy7.		
3.3.	Determining	if	unforeseen	Macro-Economic	Shocks	Affect	Guidance	
The	next	step	of	this	research	will	then	be	to	determine	the	causations	in	the	
instances	where	the	statistical	relationship	between	management	opaqueness	
(management	guidance)	and	various	firm	level	indicators	(e.g.	earnings,	stock	return)	
valid.	My	thesis	is	that	in	these	instances	where	the	relationship	is	valid	(via.	versa	
depending	on	HHI)	there	will	be	the	presence	of	macro-economic	factors	affected	by	
the	passage	of	time	since	it	is	not	held	fixed	in	this	period,	which	will	explain	the	failing	
																																																								7	The	frequency	of	management	guidance	is	pulled	from	CRSP;	this	study	doesn’t	include	non-numerical	(descriptive)	guidance	issued	by	company	management.		
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of	the	statistical	relationship.	This	non	fixed	effects	essentially	allows	the	time	variable	
to	account	for	the	different	lagged	macro	economic	factors	which	have	a	huge	effect	
on	each	different	companies	earnings	performance.	When	looking	at	certain	
companies	during	the	times	around	mi-2005	the	macroeconomic	effects	of	the	Chinese	
stock	index	dropping	should	be	present	in	certain	sectors,	as	well	as	during	mid	2006	
which	was	the	official	top	of	the	US	housing	bubble	should	produce	negative	
externalities	that	will	impact	certain	sectors	that	have	companies	which	consist	of	our	
data	set.	These	macro-economic	factors	will	impact	the	firm	level	indicators	that	affect	
management	guidance	in	a	negative	or	positive	direction,	determined	by	the	new	
perception	investors	have	with	regards	of	Management's	ability	to	determine	the	
relevancy	of	large	macro-economic	trends/events.	If	this	is	proven	true	by	this	study,	
then	there	should	be	an	inverse	relationship,	between	high	concentrated	product	
industries	(banks,	financial	institutions,	etc)8	and	low	concentrated	product	industries	
(furniture	manufacturing,	etc).	This	inversion	in	the	periods	of	which	high	concentrated	
&	low	concentrated,	each	care	about	a	firm	level	indicator	in	theory	will	be	due	to	the	
statistical	relationship	between	guidance	from	company	management	in	high	vs.	low	
concentrated	industries	as	discovered	9.		Consistent	with	prior	studies	(e.g.,	Giroud	and	
Mueller,	2010,	2011),	product	market	competition	is	measured	by	the	Herfindahl–
																																																								8	High	concentrated	product	industries	for	this	study	include,	any	company	within	the	First	Call	Dataset	that	has	starts	with	a	“6”,	and	that	have	at	least	252	observations	for	the	IV_Skew	observation,		9	Competition	improves	the	flow	of	firm-specific	information	(Hart,	1983;	Nalebuff	and	
Stiglitz,	1983),	which	may	deter	managers'	from	hiding	bad	news,	and	via	versa	for	low	
competition	markets		
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Hirschman	index	(HHI).		In	order	to	make	sure	that	the	study	is	properly	validating	any	
statistical	relationship	with	stock	price	crash	risk	and	management	skill,	it	is	necessary	
to	have	an	adequate	amount	of	controls.	So	far	along	in	this	process	the	planned	
controls	to	use	will	consist	of	implied	volatility	(of	an	at	the	money	call	option)	call,	
cash	flow	volatility,	earnings	volatility,	sales	volatility,	leverage,	and	total	volatility.	The	
final	empirical	method	that	will	be	implanted	will	be	the	manipulation	of	various	
control	variables	in	order	to	capture	any	relationship	between	management	
opaqueness	and	ex-ante	stock	price	crash	risk.	The	work	done	by	Dennis	and	Mayhew	
(2002)	will	aid	in	making	sure	that	ATM	implied	volatility	should	be	controlled	because	
of	its	effect	on	expected	crash	risk.	The	work	done	by	Pastor	and	Veronese	(2003)	
suggests	that	certain	aspects	of	a	firm’s	profitability	will	have	interaction	with	the	stock	
return	volatility.	Therefore,	including	several	operating	measures	that	have	statistical	
significance	measuring	operating	uncertainties,	such	as	cash	flow,	earnings,	and	sales	
volatility	will	suffice.	The	last	stage	of	this	part	of	my	empirical	methods	will	consist	of	
using	a	correlation	matrix	in	order	to	draw	my	inferences	upon	the	results	of	this	study.		
3.4	Empirical	Model		
The	empirical	model	that	will	be	used	to	try	and	correctly	capture/analyze	the	
relationship	between	management	guidance,	and	ex-ante	implied	crash	risk	will	be	a	
generalized	least	squares.	The	reasoning	behind	using	a	generalized	least	squares	
technique	is	to	allow	for	the	random	effects	that	are	generated	by	a	macro-economic	
shock	to	properly	be	measured.			
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Peterson	(2005)	best	describes	the	reasoning	behind	a	GLS	regression,	and	the	
benefits	of	using	such,	“When	the	residuals	of	a	panel	regression	are	correlated,	
not	only	OLS	standard	error	estimates	are	biased	but	also	the	coefficient	
estimates	are	inefficient	(the	estimates	do	not	exploit	all	of	the	information	in	
the	data).	Researchers	can	improve	efficiency	by	estimating	a	random	effects	
model	using	a	GLS	approach	(i.e.,	a	panel	data	set	with	an	unobserved	firm	
effect,	see	Wooldridge,	2007).	This	is	rarely	done	in	the	finance	literature.	Less	
than	3%	of	the	papers	in	the	survey	used	this	method	”	1011		
Additional	evidence	for	using	a	random	effects	model	vs.	a	fixed	effects	model	is	
provided	by	McManus	(2011),		
“If	we	can	assume	that	the	unobserved	heterogeneity	will	not	bias	the	estimates:	
Fixed	effects	methods	are	inefficient.	They	throw	away	information.	Pooled	OLS	
is	inefficient	because	it	does	not	exploit	the	autocorrelation	in		the	composite	
error	term.	Random	effects	methods	use	feasible	GLS	estimation	(RE	FGLS)	to	
exploit	within-cluster	correlation.	Random	effects	estimation	is	more	efficient	
than	FE	or	OLS.	The	“random	effects	assumption”	of	no	bias	due	to	Ci	more	
stringent”		
																																																								10	For	examples,	see	Maksimovic	and	Phillips,	2002;	Gentry,	Kemsley,	and	Mayer,	2003;	
and	Almazan	et	al.,	2004)	11	Panel	data	are	a	type	of	longitudinal	data,	or	data	collected	at	different	points	in	time.	
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Therefore	my	empirical	equation	will	built	with	the	following	assumptions,	outlined	by	
McManus	(2011):	Assume	the	errors	are	correlated	within	each	unit,	that	the	errors	are	
uncorrelated	across	units,	and	that	the	variance	in	the	composite	errors	is	equal	to	the	
sum	of	the	variances	in	the	unobserved	effect	and	the	idiosyncratic	error.		
	
Therefore	my	empirical	equation	will	be:		
Y(management	guidance)2	
=𝜎!𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜎!𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)		 		
Section	4.	Main	Empirical	Results		
For this paper I divided the time period into four periods following: three periods: Gen. 
Crisis: (August 2006-December 9th, 2009), Pre-crisis (August 2006–July 2007); Crisis I 
(August 2007–July 2008); and Crisis II (August 2008– December 2008). The Pre-crisis 
period is the year leading up to the collapse of the credit boom. Crisis I starts with the 
collapse of the subprime market in the summer of 2007. Crisis II begins in August 2008 
when CDS spreads of financial institutions start rising and it covers the period of greatest 
concerns about the liquidity and solvency of the financial system (the banking panic). 
Crisis III begins in September 2008- December 9th, 2009. (Scharfstein, 2010). The final 
step in the data analysis process was to winserize the variables, and insert a lag to allow 
for the proper interaction between all the variables.  
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Fig.	A.1	
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Fig.	A.2
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Fig.	A.3	
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Fig.	B.1.		
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Fig.B.2.	
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Fig.C.1		
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Fig.C.2	
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Fig.C.3.		
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Table	A.1	shows	first	a	regression	run	by	generalized	least	squares,	of	all	the	companies	
contained	within	the	data	set.	Generalized	least	square	is	the	best	method	to	perform	a	
statistical	analysis	due	to	the	present	of	temporary	effects.	Generalized	least	Squares	is	
the	preferred	technique	for	allowing	the	random	effects	with	regards	to	time,	to	effect	
the	data	as	shown	by	(Peterson,	2008).		Allowing	for	the	effect	of	a	variable	not	
contained	within	the	regression	is	a	strategy	this	is	ideal	for	this	situation.	After	running	
this	regression	I	double	checked	the	robustness	of	the	results	by	performing	an	analysis	
of	the	residuals	of	the	results	for	firms	that	were	clustered	by	Permno,	and	then	when	
first	were	clustered	by	quarter.	There	were	differences	in	the	residuals	therefore	the	
statistics	are	statistically	robust	for	this	regression.	I	think	created	an	interaction	
variable	based	off	the	company	being	a	bank	or	not,	since	this	was	one	of	the	hardest	
and	most	effected	industries	during	the	financial	crisis.	This	was	significant	all	the	way	
up	to	worst	period	of	the	financial	crisis	showing	that	being	a	bank	up	to	this	time	
period	you	were	less	likely	to	issue	guidance,	and	on	average	this	effected	guidance	
negatively	from	5	to	8	occurrences.	The	quarter	variable	in	this	regression	is	significant	
through	out	the	whole	duration	of	the	study	showing	that	time	is	something	that	is	an	
influence	when	it	comes	to	company	management.	The	interaction	variable	between	
banks	and	quarter	was	significant	in	general	for	the	whole	crisis	time	period.	However,	
when	breaking	down	the	sub	units	of	time	for	this	variable	it	failed	to	be	significant	
during	crisis	period	one	which	shows	that	during	the	start	of	a	recession	it	wasn’t	
significant	if	you	were	a	bank	vs.	regular	companies	if	you	were	going	to	give	guidance.	
The	next	variable	for	concern	is	the	lagged	IV_Skew,	which	is	the	proxy	for	perceived	
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stock	market	crash	risk.	This	was	significant	throughout	the	whole	study	showing	that	
this	has	a	strong	statistical	relationship	with	management	guidance.	The	relationship	
between	the	IV_skew	and	management	guidance	is	a	negative	relationship,	which	
shows	that	management	is	unlikely	to	release	guidance	as	the	perceived	stock	price	
crash	risk	rises.	The	variable	leverage	is	statistically	insignificant	through	out	the	whole	
regression	process.	The	variable	twelve	trailing	return	is	significant	through	out	the	
whole	regression.	This	shows	that	management	guidance	is	aware,	and	effected	by	the	
performance	of	their	company’s	stock	price	within	the	last	year.	This	relationship	shows	
that	as	the	company	does	better	management	is	less	likely	to	release	guidance.	The	
variable	market	cap	is	statically	significant	across	the	whole	regression,	and	has	a	
positive	statistically	significant	relationship	with	management	guidance.	This	shows	that	
as	a	company	is	larger	and	larger	in	market	cap,	they	are	more	and	more	likely	to	issue	
guidance.	The	earnings	volatility	is	statistically	insignificant	throughout	the	whole	
regression,	however	it	is	significant	within	the	various	sub	time	periods.	All	the	way	up	
to	the	worst	part	of	the	crisis	period	CP2,	earnings	volatility	is	significant.	This	shows	
that	up	till	the	point	of	the	worst	period	in	the	crisis,	this	was	a	significant	variable.	This	
is	due	to	the	relationship	that	this	variable	has	with	banks	and	manufacturing	
companies.	This	is	because	of	the	tendency	of	companies	to	release	guidance	base	on	
their	industry	concentration,	this	is	touched	on	by	(Hannan,	1997).	This	observation	
upon	the	behavior	of	earnings	volatility	is	what	drives	my	next	two-subunit	analysis/	
additional	test.	The	variable	sales	volatility	is	statically	significant	throughout	the	entire	
regression.	This	shows	that	management	is	likely	to	issue	guidance	when	sales	volatility	
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rises.	This	is	due	to	the	fact,	that	industry	analysts	will	recognize	any	major	disruption	
the	sales	process,	and	promotes	the	early	release	of	bad	news,	as	mentioned	in	section	
2.	The	crash	variable	is	statistically	significant	throughout	the	entire	regression,	showing	
that	during	the	crisis	period	if	a	company	experienced	a	stock	price	crash	they	were	
likely	to	issue	guidance.	Overall,	table	a.1	shows	that	there	is	a	statically	significant	
relationship	between	management	guidance,	and	perceived	stock	price	crash	risk.	The	
results	in	Table	A.1	lead	me	to	believe	that	it	was	necessary	to	further	inspect	the	
relationship	between	the	firm	level	variables	and	management	guidance.	I	will	direct	my	
analysis	on	the	fluctuation	of	significance	between	earnings	volatility.		
5.1.	Additional	Analysis		
To	further	investigate	the	relationship	between	management	guidance,	and	implied	
volatility	skew	I	performed	an	analysis	of	the	data	again	using	generalized	least	squares	
in	this	case.		Table A.2 includes the results from a GLS regression run only on data 
included from a bank, (This was done by sorting the data by SIC).  This analysis was run 
in order to account for random effects and exclude any bias. Based on the results we 
determine that ln_mark~p, twelve_~t and sale_vol are all significant through each 
quarter tested. This indicates that they are all parameters that banks take into 
consideration when issuing management guidance. That said, the predictor leverage is 
insignificant for the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. This would imply that leverage is not 
a major indicator for banks when issuing management guidance. Additionally, earn_vol 
(the predictor for earnings volatility) is significant in the pre-crisis period but is 
insignificant in the last quarter. This indicates that banks were concerned with earnings 
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volatility before and during the crash. However, in the subsequent quarters after the 
crash, they became less concerned with including earnings volatility as a parameter for 
management guidance in a time of crisis. This is a relevant finding because it provides 
empirical evidence that banks are less concerned with earnings volatility after a crisis, 
and only during a time where inadequate management skill could be used to potentially 
blame them for failing to see the effect/potential effect of a macro-economic shock.  
 After seeing the statistical pattern relationship shown in Table B.1 there is a clear 
need to look at the relationship for management guidance, and other firm level variables 
with regards to a low concentrated industry. Therefore, for this last regression I dropped 
all companies that didn’t have “25” starting their SIC #. This drops all the companies 
except those involved in the manufacturing sector, specifically those that focus on 
making home furniture items etc.  Table C.1 show the output results of another GLS 
regression excluding the data from banks (i.e. only including manufacturing-industry 
data). For the general crisis period, twelve-month earnings, market cap and sales 
volatility are all significant indicators in management guidance. Additionally, earnings 
volatility is significant by a narrow margin (0.0405). However, the most interesting part of 
this regression is how earnings volatility for manufacturing companies, act oppositely 
with regards to statistical significance than financial companies who are in a more 
concentrated industry, which has been shown by earlier studies to have a negative 
statically relationship with guidance. Earnings volatility not being significant during the 
CP2 for manufacturing companies shows that the market, and management were 
concerned with it only after the CP1 had begun, because the macro-economic shock 
was directly involved in this sector such as with the financial institutions. Also in this 
output, we observe that leverage is insignificant for every quarter tested. The crash 
variable is significant after the CP2showing that, a company experiencing a stock price 
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crash, and being a manufacturing company during this time was likely to issue guidance 
after the market realized the initial shock had be realized. Crash quarter is significant 
every period except during the start of the crisis at CP1 showing that during this time 
period, the management recognized that their company could be hit materially from the 
impact in the other sectors of the economy. The lagged IV_Skew variable is once again 
significant through the overall regression period and within the sub units of time, showing 
that manufacturing management does care about the perceived stock price crash risk by 
the market. Once again a negative statistical relationship is observed between stock 
price crash risk and management guidance. Leverage once again is insignificant to the 
management guidance. The several variables, sales volatility, twelve month return and 
market cap once again have statistical significance with management guidance, and in 
this case both variables are positively correlated with management guidance.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 In conclusion this study shows that there is a statically significant relationship 
between, management guidance and implied stock price crash risk for a company. 
Looking further at the additional results for the study, I can conclude that when company 
management doesn’t foresee an unexpected macro economic shock, they then are 
concerned about potentially being responsible for the failing to see the pitfall. This fear of 
being exposed for not understanding larger macro economic trends then leads 
management to try and withhold this guidance. However, management with holding 
guidance due to a failure to foresee an economic shock, only leads to the build up of bad 
information, which previous studies have shown causes the majority of stock price 
crashes and not actual major market crashes. Hopefully, this paper encourages further 
		 33	
research into the use of the implied volatility skew, and management guidance behavior 
during the financial crisis.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		 34	
	
		 35	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
References		
		 36	
Ahsan Habib, Haiyan Jiang, Mostaufa Monzar Hasan, 2014. Stock Price Crash Risk: 
Review of the Empirical Literature  
Bradshaw et al., 2010. Bradshaw, M.T., Hutton, A.P., Marcus, A.J., Tehranian, H., 2010. 
Opacity, crash risk and option smirk curves. Working paper. Boston College. 
De Franco et al., 2011, G. De Franco, S.P. Kothari, R.S. Verdi., The benefits of financial 
statement comparability, J. Account. Res., 49 (4) (2011), pp. 895–931 
Dennis and Mayhew, 2002, P. Dennis, S. Mayhew, Risk-neutral skewness: evidence from 
stock options, J. Finance. Quant. Anal., 37 (3) (2002), pp. 471–493 
Dumas, B., Fleming, J. Whaley. R, 1998: Implied volatility functions: empirical tests. 
J.Finance, Quant. Anal. 37 (3), 471-493 
Barth, M., Landsman, W., Lang, M., Williams, C., 2012. Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-
based accounting amounts comparable? J. Account. Econ. 54 (1), 68–93. 
Barth, M., Landsman, W., Lang, M., Williams, C., 2013. Williams Effects on 
comparability and capital market benefits of voluntary adoption of IFRS by US 
firms: insights from voluntary adoption of IFRS by non-US firms. Working paper. 
Stanford University. 
Blanc, Mariano, Duro Felguera Cfo, Villabona 13, and Asturias Spain 23507 
Nava.Money Multiplier Dynamics and Banking Liquidity Cycles (n.d.): n. pag. 
Web. 
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J. Polit. 
Econ. 81 (3), 637–654. 
Bates, D., 2000. Post-'87 crash fears in the S&P 500 futures option market. J. 
Econom.94 (1-2), 181-238  
Bates, D., 2008. The Market Crash Risk. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 32 (7). 2291-2321  
Guyon, Julien and Henry-Labordere, Pierre, From Spot Volatilities to Implied Volatilities 
(June 25, 2010).   
Gong, G., Li, L.Y., Zhou, L., 2013. Earnings non‐synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. 
Contemp. Account. Res. 30 (4), 1560–1589. 
Hutton et al., 2009. A.P. Hutton, A.J. Marcus, H. Tehranian. Opaque financial reports, 
R2, and crash risk., J. Financ. Econ., 94 (1) (2009), pp. 67–86 
Jeong-Bon Kim, Leye Li, Louise Yi lu, Yang Xin Yu, 2014. Financial Statement 
Comparability & expected crash Risk.  
Jin, L., Myers, S., 2006. R2 around the world: new theory and new tests. J. Financ. Econ. 
79 (2), 257–292. 
Kim et al., 2011a., J.-B. Kim, Y. Li, L. Zhang., Corporate tax avoidance and stock price 
crash risk: firm-level analysis., J. Finance. Econ., 100 (3) (2011), pp. 639–662 
Kim et al., 2011b., J.-B. Kim, Y. Li, L. Zhang, CFOs versus CEOs: equity incentives and 
crashes, J. Finance. Econ., 101 (3) (2011), pp. 713–730 
Kim, J.-B., Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan 
Contracting: Evidence from firm level analysis  
Kim and Zhang, 2015., J.-B. Kim, L. Zhang., Accounting conservatism and stock price 
crash risk: firm-level evidence., Contemp. Account. Res. (2015) forthcoming 
Kim, Jeong-Bon and Li, Leye and Lu, Louise Yi and Yu, Yangxin, Financial Statement 
Comparability and Expected Crash Risk (January 1, 2016). Journal of Accounting 
		 37	
& Economics (JAE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709908 
Li, Minqiang, You Don't Have to Bother Newton for Implied Volatility (November, 
2006).  
Mitchell A. Petersen; Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches. Rev Financ Stud 2009; 22 (1): 435-480. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhn053 
McManus, Patricia A. "Introduction to Regression Models for Panel Data Analysis." 
Workshop in Methods. Indiana University. 20 Apr. 2017. 
 
Numpacharoen, Kawee and Bunwong, Kornkanok, A New Algorithm for Computing 
Implied Volatility (July 13, 2011). East-West Journal of Mathematics, 
Forthcoming. Available at  
Pástor and Veronesi, 2003, L. Pástor, P. Veronesi., Stock valuation and learning about 
profitability, J. Financ., 58 (5) (2003), pp. 1749–1789 	
